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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________                        
 
No. 11-3775 
_____________ 
    
MILAGROS CHALUISAN, 
                          Appellant 
 
v. 
 
COMMISSIONER SOCIAL SECURITY                          
_____________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil No. 2-10-cv-05918) 
District Judge: Honorable Stanley R. Chesler 
_____________                         
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 21, 2012 
 
Before:  RENDELL, FUENTES and HARDIMAN, Circuit 
 
Judges 
(Opinion Filed:  June 4, 2012)                         
_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT                         
_____________ 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge
 Milagros Chaluisan appeals a judgment of the District Court affirming a 
final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security that Chaluisan is not entitled 
to supplemental security income (otherwise known as SSI) benefits for the period 
. 
2 
between 1984 and 1998 because she was not disabled under the Social Security 
Act during that time.  We will affirm. 
I. 
This case has a long and complicated history.  Chaluisan, who has suffered 
from scoliosis since she was a child, applied for benefits from the time of her 
diagnosis, in 1982, to the present.  She has been determined disabled, and awarded 
corresponding benefits, for the periods between 1982 and 1984 and 1998 to the 
present.  Two separate ALJ decisions have determined that Chaluisan was not 
disabled between 1984 and 1998. 
The first of those decisions was issued on July 26, 2005.  In twenty-five, 
single-spaced pages, the ALJ reviewed all of the medical and other evidence and 
applied the Zebley presumption to the portion of Chaluisan’s claim that pertained 
to the period before she turned 18 (in 1988) and the adult Social Security standards 
to the remainder.1
                                              
1  The “Zebley presumption” arose out of a settlement entered into by class 
plaintiffs following the Supreme Court’s decision in Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 
521 (1990).  The settlement provided for the re-adjudication of all SSI claims that 
were denied for children before 1990 and allowed for inferences of childhood 
disability in such adjudications under certain, prescribed circumstances.  See 
Zebley v. Sullivan, No. 83-3314, 1991 WL 65530, at *6-7, 9 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 14, 
1991) (Stipulation and Order of Settlement). 
  As relevant to this appeal, the ALJ determined that 
(1) Chaluisan engaged in substantial gainful activity as a cashier, and therefore 
was not disabled as an adult, in 1988 and 1989; (2) the medical evidence did not 
support a determination of adult disability between 1990 and 1998 because 
Chaluisan did not present the range of physiological symptoms required to support 
3 
a determination that she suffered from a sufficiently disabling spinal disorder 
because the records demonstrated that Chaluisan’s back pain during that time did 
not require inpatient or other extraordinary treatment or medication (other than 
with nonsteroidal anti-inflammatories, for a brief period), and therefore would not 
have prevented Chaluisan from performing sedentary work; (3) disability from 
1984 to 1988 could not reasonably be inferred under Zebley because the finding of 
disability beginning in 1998 occurred after a period of adult non-disability and was 
attributable to a worsening of symptoms at that time; and (4) applying current and 
previous rules, the evidence did not support a finding of disability between 1984 
and 1998.   
Chaluisan appealed that decision to the District Court and, in a 2008 
opinion, the District Court addressed each of the issues before us in this appeal.  
First, the District Court found the ALJ had applied the correct legal standard from 
Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521 (1990), to Chaluisan’s claim, but remanded the 
case to the ALJ for further explanation of his conclusions and the basis for his 
reliance on the Commissioner’s medical expert.  Second, the District Court 
determined that the ALJ gave proper weight to each treating physician’s opinion, 
and, with one exception, properly explained his reasons for accepting or rejecting 
each doctor’s testimony.  The District Court remanded the case for further 
explanation of the ALJ’s decision to reject the testimony of one physician, Dr. 
Sabato.  Third, the District Court determined Chaluisan was not denied a fair 
hearing because tapes from her previous testimony could not be located.  The 
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District Court reasoned that the same information was contained in written records 
and Chaluisan had the opportunity to testify.   
Chaluisan appealed that decision, but we dismissed Chaluisan’s appeal for 
lack of jurisdiction after the Appeals Council vacated the underlying 
administrative decision.  Another hearing was held before a different ALJ, who 
provided further explanation as directed by the District Court and again 
determined that Chaluisan was not disabled for the period 1984 to 1998.  
Chaluisan again appealed to the District Court, where the case was assigned to a 
different district judge. 
In a 2011 opinion, the District Court declined to reconsider any of the 
previous judge’s rulings, asserting that they were now law of the case.  It found 
that, on remand, the ALJ had sufficiently explained the basis for the disability 
determinations, and it affirmed the determination that Chaluisan was not disabled 
from 1984 to 1998.  Chaluisan now appeals. 
II. 
On appeal, Chaluisan reasserts the same arguments that she presented to the 
District Court:  (1) the ALJs improperly denied her the presumption of disability 
to which she was entitled under the Zebley settlement; (2) the ALJs failed to give 
her treating physicians’ opinions adequate weight; and (3) the ALJs denied her a 
fair hearing by failing to locate tapes of her testimony from earlier hearings.  In 
reviewing denials of SSI benefits, our review of legal issues is plenary.  Sykes v. 
Apfel, 228 F.3d 259, 262 (3d Cir. 2000).  We apply the same deferential standard 
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as the District Court to the Commissioner’s fact findings, asking whether those 
findings are supported by “substantial evidence.”  Id.  Applying those standards, 
we reject each of Chaluisan’s three arguments. 
First, the ALJs did not misapply Zebley.  Chaluisan argues that the Zebley 
settlement requires an ALJ that finds a current disability to find disability as of the 
claimant’s earliest application for benefits within the Zebley class period unless 
there is a contrary medical judgment.2  While one part of the Social Security 
Administration’s “Hearings, Appeals and Litigation Law Manual” (“HALLEX”) 
supports that assertion, see HALLEX 1-5-4-28A(V), that provision has no basis in 
the language of the Zebley settlement itself, which provides only that, in cases 
(like this one) where the claimant is found to be disabled in the current 
proceedings, and evidence of the claimant’s past condition is not readily 
available,3
                                              
2  Chaluisan’s brief misleadingly suggests that the Zebley standards apply to the 
entire “Interim Period,” from 1984 to 1998.  See, e.g., Appellant’s Br. 31 (“A 
presumption of disability during the Interim Period is warranted because the 
record establishes that Chaluisan meets the Zebley criteria . . . .”).  In fact, the 
Zebley standards apply only to the period before a claimant “attained age 18.”  
Beginning on the day the claimant “attains age 18,” which, in this case, was 
December 10, 1988, claims are evaluated according to the same disability 
standards that apply to adults.  See Social Security Administration, Office of 
Disability Adjudication and Review, HALLEX:  Hearings, Appeals and Litigation 
Law Manual I-5-4-28-A-IV, available at http://www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/hallex/I-
05/I-5-4-28-A.html#I-5-4-28-A-IV (“HALLEX”). 
 “the adjudicator will determine, based on the nature of the impairment, 
 
3  Both of those conditions are met here.  The 2008 District Court opinion 
specifically found that Chaluisan did not qualify for the standard that applies to 
claimants with “subsequent” disability determinations because the relevant adult 
disability determination was made in the same 2005 ALJ decision that re-
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whether it is reasonable to presume that the class member’s past condition and 
impairments were as severe as they are currently.”  Zebley, 1991 WL 65530, at *9.  
Notwithstanding HALLEX’s addition of a contrary-evidence standard in cases like 
Chaluisan’s, the Zebley settlement controls.  Internal social security manuals lack 
the force of law and do not bind the Social Security Administration.  See 
Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785, 789 (1989) (per curiam); accord Moore v. 
Apfel, 216 F.3d 864, 868 (9th Cir. 2000) (“HALLEX is strictly an internal 
guidance tool, providing policy and other procedural guidelines to ALJs and other 
staff members.  As such, it does not . . . carry the force and effect of law.”). 
The ALJs appropriately followed the Zebley settlement in this case.  In the 
2005 opinion, the ALJ opined that “it would not be reasonable to infer disability” 
for the relevant period.  App. 60.  After the District Court remanded the case so 
the Commissioner could further explain the basis for its decision, a second ALJ 
concluded that a presumption that Chaluisan’s impairments were as severe as of 
1984 as in 1998, when Chaluisan was again determined to be disabled, was “not 
reasonable . . . in the circumstances of this case.”  We find no legal error here. 
                                                                                                                                       
adjudicated Chaluisan’s Zebley claim.  See Chaluisan v. Astrue, No. 07-3130, 
2008 WL 5427901, at *9 (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 2008).  Chaluisan’s brief suggests that 
she does not accept that determination, see Appellant’s Br. 34, but because she has 
not directly challenged it on appeal, we are bound to accept it.  Chaluisan admits 
and, indeed, urges that evidence of her past condition is not readily available.  See 
id. at 35 (arguing that the “lack of records” for the “period at issue” precluded the 
expert witnesses from rendering “any opinion as to the severity or effects of 
Chaluisan’s impairments”). 
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Second, the ALJs did not violate any rule concerning the evidentiary weight 
due to treating physicians’ opinions.  Treating physicians’ opinions as to the 
nature and severity of a claimant’s impairment (but not as to the ultimate legal 
issue of disability, see 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(1)) are entitled to “controlling 
weight” if the Commissioner finds that those opinions are “well-supported by 
medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques” and are “not 
inconsistent with the other substantial evidence” in the record.  20 C.F.R. 
§ 416.972(c)(2).  The District Courts properly considered and rejected Chaluisan’s 
argument in this regard, finding that the ALJs adequately explained their reasons 
for accepting or rejecting each of the treating physicians’ opinions.  We will not 
repeat their analyses here other than to state that we agree with and adopt them. 
Third, Chaluisan’s due-process argument lacks merit.  We agree with the 
District Court’s 2008 analysis:  Chaluisan had ample opportunities to testify at the 
2005 hearing; her subjective complaints were further represented by her medical 
reports and the testimony of her treating physicians; and the ALJs properly 
weighed all of the evidence, including subjective complaints and objective 
medical evidence, and reached an appropriate, well reasoned determination.  We 
therefore will not reverse on this ground. 
III. 
Accordingly, and for the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the 
judgment of the District Court. 
